Let Mali fight its own battles

Earlier this year when Captain Sanogo took over the government of Mali in an accidental coup he said his intention was to get the resources he needed to defeat Touraeg and Islamist forces in the north.  In the chaos that followed Malian military forces were driven from the north and the independent state of Azawad was established.  No other state recognizes Azawad and the rebel organization that led the fight to establish Azawad, the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), seems to have lost power to Islamic extremists such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  AQIM has sought to install its particular brand of Islam in Azawad, imposed Sharia Law, and destroyed ancient temples and shrines that it found offensive.

Despite gaining great power in Mali, Sanogo has not accomplished his original objective of reinforcing and rearming the Malian military to defeat enemy forces in the north.  I assume that running a country was a bigger challenge than he wanted so he took a step back to allow the interim President and Prime Ministers to deal with the political mess.  It is evident that Sanogo retains great influence as the former Prime Minister was arrested this week by military troops and was replaced with a new Prime Minister.  The former Prime Minister had disagreed with Sanogo by advocating for the international community to put foreign troops on the ground to take back Azawad.  Sanogo, however has maintained that he wants his own troops to do the fighting and wants international support.

I think that it is noble for Mali to want to take care of its own problems.  If part of the United States was taken over by rebels we would want to take care of the problem ourselves, without foreign troops doing the fighting for us.  Letting France do the fighting would be like running back to a former colonial master, and would likely oblige Mali to engage in unfavorable trade with France in the future.  Other countries that have pledged troops under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) don't have a great reputation for being neutral in ECOWAS peace keeping operations.  It would be easier for Mali to deal with peer countries in ECOWAS than major western powers like the US or France, however the quality of forces from ECOWAS countries are less capable. 

The US has already committed troops in Africa to the hunt for the LRA but mainly in a support and advisory role.  The US involvement in Libya was controversial at home, especially following the murder of Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi.  With ongoing economic problems in the US, the looming fiscal cliff, and defense cuts the US might not be as willing to engage with boots on the ground in Mali for a campaign that will most likely last several months, if not longer.  However, the US can contribute airlift support, intelligence, equipment, fuel, food, training, and funding.  Other allies can do the same.

As Malians should coordinate their own efforts to retake the north, they should host a conference with countries willing to contribute and coordinate their potential resources in a clear, open manner.  If the Malians are suspected of stealing donor support donations would be limited.  Advisers from France, US, and other allies can help the Malian leadership with developing a campaign plan but the operations should be Mali led and fought by Mali troops.

Before the loss of northern Mali, the military was estimated to have 8000 active troops (7,350 Army, 400 Air Force, and 50 Navy).  There were an additional 1,800 Gendarmerie, 2000 Republican Guard, and 3000 militia.  The military of Mali was trained to the point of contributing troops to international peace keeping operations in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Central African Republic.  However, much equipment was lost in the north when government troops fled and there was a falling out between the Republican Guard loyal to the former president and the military so the amount of troops and equipment available for military campaign is reduced.  The government can also conscript and train additional adults to serve in the military to augment Malian combat strength (and will take more time).

The MNLA forces that drove government forces from the north were well equipped with heavy weapons from the Libya war.  AQIM troops are also well financed from kidnapping ransoms, donations, drug trafficking, theft, and network support.  Foreign fighters have also joined MNLA/AQIM troops in northern Mali and terrorist groups have set up training camps in the region.

The fight to take back northern Mali will not be easy or quick, but can be accomplished successfully if Malian troops are well armed, equipped, and motivated.  This can be done without foreign combat boots on the ground but would still require great international support and donations with little corruption.  It seems that international donors, ECOWAS, and other major powers are willing to contribute to the cause to liberate the north of Mali so funding is available.  However, the questions that still linger are who is really in charge of the government?  Can donors support a government that gained power through a coup? and What is the political future of Mali?

Thesis Defense

Yesterday I successfully defended my thesis "COIN and the LRA" before a panel of professors at Boston University.  After a 15 minute overview of my paper the panel quizzed me for 45 minutes, and in the end, I passed without any need for revision or correction.  The questions the panel asked were interesting and mostly not related to my study of the Ugandan counterinsurgency strategy targeting the Lord's Resistance Army. 

One professor claimed that the LRA did not meet the model of a traditional insurgency in the past ten years as they have relied more on child abductions for recruitment. I countered that there are many insurgent groups in Africa and other places that recruit child soldiers so the LRA is not a singular example.  Also, the use of abducted children changes the way the community interacts with the insurgents as their own children are forced to participate against their will.  Community support of the insurgents is always critical to the success of an insurgency.  I also cited the 2000 Amnesty Act and traditional reconciliation methods such as Mato Oput that eased the return of former combatants.

Another professor focused on criticizing US military COIN doctrine that I referenced in my paper.  The US military published new counterinsurgency doctrine in Field Manual 3-24 in 2006.  The new doctrine was put together by General Petraeus and a panel of experts and based on the thinking of David Galula.  Galula published his book in 1964 "Counterinsurgecy Warfare: Theory and Practice" based on his own counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria as a platoon commander.  However, the professor on my panel questioned the legitimacy of the doctrine as he claimed that Galula embellished his successes.  The other examples upon which the new US doctrine was based were mostly from failed efforts so they were unlikely to result in success.  This is something that Martin van Creveld also argued in his 2008 piece "The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq."  The panelist also argued that the new US COIN doctrine did not result in success in either Iraq or Afghanistan and the only reason why Iraq quieted down was the US paying off Iraqi leaders (what I call the "Cash as COIN" policy).  Paying off insurgents isn't in US COIN doctrine, but it appears its a tactic that the US frequently uses.

I countered that even though US COIN doctrine in FM 3-24 may be based upon failed counterinsurgency efforts there are many good points that the government of Uganda used to defeat the LRA.  I believe that appropriating the causes of the insurgency through northern development programs, cutting off Sudanese support for the LRA, and military operations to drive the LRA far from Ugandan territory were critical in defeating the LRA.  The military manual lists many different tactics that can be helpful in defeating an insurgency but before a comprehensive COIN strategy is developed the government must first study the insurgency and try to understand it to develop a customized COIN plan.  Unity of effort is critical as well as demonstrated in the Ugandan LRA example where President Museveni shorted the Bigombe talks in 1994 by demanding an immediate surrender from Kony.  Instead, Kony and the LRA fled to southern Sudan where they established bases, were financed and supplied by the Sudanese government, and increased raids on Uganda. 

Another example of successful COIN a professor on my panel cited was the extermination of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka by military operations.  The professor claimed that if the government doesnt care about international outcry and killing lots of people its not necessary to follow my more gentle COIN recommendations.  My counter-argument was that even though the insurgents may have been wiped out, the underlying problems still remained and protests and insurgency would probably return when conditions allowed or it was worth the risk.

Questions on military intervention in Mali

As the world gets spun up to send troops into Mali to defeat Islamists and others who established the state of Azawad in northern Mali I have a few concerns.

1.  Mali has been particular with what kind of military assistance it receives and in what manner, preferring to be re-equipped and financed to take care of the northern insurrection itself.  This seems to be inline with CPT Sanogo's original complaint that led to his accidental coup back in March (that the government of Mali wasn't providing enough support to fight northern rebels).

2.  The government situation in Mali still hasn't been sorted out with Sanogo retaining some control of the government.  Currently the US can not provide military assistance or funding to the government of Mali as Sanogo retains some power.  If the Malian army was resupplied, rearmed, and reequipped with Sanogo retaining some control of the military and government it would cement his power.

3.  Nigerian troops have been mentioned as providing a large part of the 3,300 ECOWAS troops intervening in Mali given their participation in past African Union, UN, and ECOWAS/ECOMOG actions.  However, Nigerian troops earned a bad reputation in Sierra Leone and Liberia for stealing and taking sides in the conflict.  Nigeria has also been fighting its own insurgency without great success against Boko Haram and its not likely they would have success against other Islamist insurgents either.

4.  There is no guarantee this will be a quick and easy fight, regardless of who is fighting.  Mali has been fighting insurgents for some time and when they took over Azawad they did it with heavy weapons and arms from Libya.  Even if the MNLA/Azawadian troops are defeated there will remain some support for the insurgency due to the need for development, ethnic conflict, and other past issues in northern Mali.  The need for development and investment in northern Mali is even greater after extremists have destroyed buildings, sites, and infrastructure deemed incompatible with their beliefs.

5.  By the way, when do coup leaders become recognized as legit leaders and start receiving US aid again? Just when we realize there is no going back and we can gain more from working with them than against them?

COIN & the LRA

Here's the abstract to my paper on Counter Insurgency and the Lord's Resistance Army:

Abstract

      Insurgency, or the attempts to overthrow the government by military and political means has long been a threat to established governments, especially since the 20^th century where the technological advances in the military gave the government superiority that was difficult for the average armed civilian to match.  As insurgent groups engaged in terrorism and guerrilla warfare to overthrow the state, governments have engaged counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics to defeat insurgencies.  The ongoing 26-year insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda is illustrative of COIN tactics, its successes, and failures.  Examination of Ugandan COIN will reveal which tactics were most effective and how others could have been implemented better.  The study of Ugandan LRA COIN tactics may also yield suggestions for how to deal with other insurgencies in the region.

     I am still revising my paper and I may re-edit my abstract again but I am running out of time!  My paper goes to the presses this coming Saturday so I can turn it in early Monday, 26 Nov 2012.  After that I have a week to prepare for my paper defense to be scheduled some time during the first two weeks of December.

Working on Thesis

I'm still here, just focused on my thesis "Counterinsurgency and the Lord's Resistance Army." Its due by Thanksgiving so I got a lot of work to do!

Book Review: Sudan

 Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence by Jok Madut Jok

Written in 2007 before the referendum on South Sudan and the independence of South Sudan in 2011, Jok’s book on Sudan provides good insight into the issues that caused the division of Sudan.  The book focuses on the time period after independence in 1956 where an Arab government has tried to convert the diverse population of Sudan to the Arab culture and Islamic religion.  The government gave preference to Arab Muslims over Black or African Muslims even though it is hard to distinguish and culture and ethnicity were fluid in the past.  As competition for scarce resources became more intense the government sided with Arab Muslims over all others and led to what the US has characterized as genocide in the Darfur region. However, the US and other world powers decided to take no action with Darfur in case it would disrupt the long-negotiated peace deal between the north and south.   

Jok was very thorough in his book and his details on military abuses, gender violence, resettlement, using aid to cause people to convert, starvation tactics, and the fight over oil revenues showed that the violence would continue after independence for South Sudan.  It seems that the war between Sudan and South Sudan has continued unabated as the north has bombed southern areas repeatedly and their respective militaries have engaged in combat on several occasions.  Sudan has also continued to repopulate Darfur and refugees continue to flee to Chad, CAR, and Sudan’s other neighbors.  Jok also foresaw the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments and arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir, issued in March 2009 for war crimes and in July 2010 for genocide and discussed the ICC investigations in 2006.

Sudan and South Sudan are still negotiating oil profits as most of the oil is produced in the south but must pass through the pipelines in the north to the refineries and Port of Sudan.  Other pipelines are under construction in the south to Kenya and through Ethiopia to Djibouti to provide alternate routes for the oil, but are not expected to be completed until 2015 or later.

Now that the southern issue has been resolved with the independence of South Sudan, what will happen with Darfur?

UPDF Thesis Musings

At the beginning of summer I thought I had a great thesis idea, to explore the evolution of the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) from a bush army that brought Museveni to power to a professional fighting force leading the fight against Al Shabab in Somalia.  In May I traveled to Uganda for 30 days to research the UPDF and met with some Ugandan officers, soldiers, regular people, Ugandan military trainers, and politicians who fought with Museveni in the independence war.  However, it was hard to get information about the transformation of the UPDF.  People were very proud of the way they came to power defeating the government forces, and what they are doing now in Somalia and the region hunting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), but didnt share much about the interim period.  While I was there an American researcher was arrested by the Ugandan secret police for asking too many questions of military officers so I ran out of sources.  After that, nobody wanted to discuss the UPDF and I didn't want to end up in a secret prison, so I dropped it.

I also discovered that although the UPDF is doing great things in Somalia and is a pretty good fighting force, some issues remain.  For example, there is no established program for promotion in the military and no retirement program.  You have to know someone to get promoted or a pay raise, which pays off if you are the President's son and just got promoted to General and placed in command of the Ugandan Special Forces.  However, there are many privates who have served since the bush wars and never got promoted or advanced.  One officer I interviewed said there was no retirement program so people serve indefinitely because there is no life after the military.  That's also why many of the military leaders develop side businesses (like rental vehicle agencies, shipping companies, hotels).  The officer also explained that the Ugandan budget did not provide for pay or planning beyond the month or year so there was no assurances that there would be pay for retirees in the future.  He did say that he got special government housing as a perk.  Another concern I had about the UPDF is that some leaders had risen to power after being implicated in the violent suppression of the opposition. 

As it comes time to officially commit to a thesis I am starting to doubt my thesis.  Is there enough substance to this topic?

Other ideas I had were to explore the security situation in Chad, looking at the 2008 rebel advance, French support, tribal pressures, Libyan interference, and religious conflict.  The other idea was look into the bromance between Museveni, Kagame, and Kabila from their origins in the bush to current discord with Uganda forces banned from the DRC and Rwanda forces messing around in the DRC.

There isn't a whole lot written about Chad so it will be hard to find a multitude of sources.  However, there is a whole lot written about the MKK love triangle and their involvement of the wars of central Africa.  I have always thought it was interesting how Kagame worked for Museveni when Museveni was fighting to come to power.  Then Museveni and Kagame brought Kabila to power but were given the boot after the second Congo war.  Their relationships still affect conflict in the region.

Any suggestions?