Friday, January 4, 2013

On the "Clash of Civilizations?"


Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis in “The Clash of Civilizations?” is the world is changing and future conflicts will be culturally based and “between nations and groups of different civilizations” (Huntington, p. 22).  Huntington defined a civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.  It is defined by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people” (ibid, p. 24).  The size of a civilization is not important and a civilization may include several states or overlap other civilizations.  Civilizations also grow, change, evolve, and frequently die out.  Huntington postulated that the seven to eight major civilizations that will dominate future world affairs are: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin, and perhaps the African (ibid, p. 25). 
This clash of civilizations will take place, according to Huntington, due to the different values between civilizations, increasing interaction between civilizations due to globalization, and the growing importance of religion compared to a decline in nationalism.  Part of the decline of nationalism and growth of “civilization-consciousness” is due to the Westerners looking back to their roots in other civilizations (ibid, p. 26).  Huntington also argued that cultural differences were harder to mute than political or economic differences and these differences will be accentuated as civilizations come into increasing contact.  Civilizations will clash at the micro-level, or along “fault lines” where bordering civilizations interact, or at the macro-level as civilizations compete for power, wealth, dominance, and to promote their own values (ibid, p. 29). 
Huntington argued that the clash between civilizations along the fault lines has been evident for centuries.  For example, the boundary between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity and Islam has been an area for conflict since 1500 (ibid, p. 30).  Huntington also cited the Velvet Curtain and Iron Curtain in Europe as physical dividing lines in Europe that separated civilizations but also argued that the wars between Christians and Muslims over Europe and North Africa constituted a fault line.  Wars and conflicts have continued along the boundaries of Islam and Huntington used examples of the Balkans, Arab slavers in Africa, southern Russia, and between Muslims and Hindus in India. 
Conflict between nations will reach civilization levels due to “kin-country syndrome” where people in conflict with others from another civilization will call for aid from those of their own civilization.  Huntington illustrated this with the example of the 1990 Gulf War where the war began when a Muslim country (Iraq) invaded another Muslim country (Kuwait) but the conflict became a war of the “West against Islam” when the US became involved (ibid, p. 35).  Iraq called for assistance from other Muslim countries, and religious and political leaders colored the conflict as fighting the West instead of supporting the country that was invaded.  After citing other examples, Huntington argued that “civilization rallying” has the potential to spread in the future (ibid, p. 38). 
         Huntington also argued that Western civilization is already at conflict with the rest of the world on a macro-level as it uses the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), and other international organizations dominated by the West to promote its economic interests and to impose Western policies on the rest of the world.  Western values, according to Huntington and his sources, are in conflict with those of other major civilizations, forcing other civilizations to react.  Since the West is currently the dominate civilization, other civilizations can choose to withdraw from international relations, copy the West, or oppose the West in an attempt to balance the gravity of the Western civilization (ibid, p. 41).
The overlap of civilizations in a country, which is more obvious in a large country such as Russia, will create “torn countries,” which Huntington argued, “are candidates for dismemberment” (ibid, p. 42).  Huntington also cited the examples of Mexico and Turkey, which are members of competing civilizations but may choose to align themselves as a nation with the most beneficial civilization.
The main threat, according to Huntington’s argument, is that other civilizations will combat the dominance of the Western civilization, and the West will lose its influence, power, and economic advantage in the world.  Diversity and acceptance are also threats to non-Western civilizations as they dilute the commonality and uniqueness of a civilization. 
In the Clash of Civilizations, future military conflicts will be different from those of traditional nation against nation regular warfare.  Huntington accepts war and conflict as part of international relations, but with the Clash, he argues that future conflict will either be a continuation of conflict along the fault lines between civilizations or smaller conflicts will expand as nations from the same civilization gang up on adversaries of a conflicting civilization, as evidenced by the first Gulf War.  The primary challenge will be to dissuade like-minded nations from piling on as nations try to pull other nations from the same civilization into the conflict.
Civilization-ism creates increased opportunities for trade within the civilization, developing bonds of trust that can be called upon in future conflicts.  However, increased equally beneficial trade between civilizations lessens differences and can improve relations. Cross-civilization exchanges will also increase understanding of other civilizations and decrease the threat of a violent clash.  It is a major advantage for the Western civilization that most foreign leaders are educated in the West or have exposure to the Western civilization.  Civilization or cultural clashes can be avoided with increased understanding and exposure.
Samuel Huntington has correctly captured conflict in the past along cultural or civilization lines but failed in his theory in several points.  First, a religion is not the same as a culture.  Huntington singles out Islam as a civilization but in reality it is a religion that while observed by many around the world spanning multiple cultures, has violent divisions within itself.  In addition, in the section in Africa, Huntington uses the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably while there are huge differences between an African Muslim and an Arab Muslim (ibid, p. 33).  Perhaps Huntington was classifying countries that incorporate Islamic thought into their laws as Muslim, but in that case he should have classified Western countries as Christian for the same reason.  Conflict between religions is significant, but in the framework of Huntington’s argument it is incorrect to classify Islam as a civilization.
Second, people act in accordance with their self-interest and states act in accordance with the will of their leaders.  Constitutions provide guidance for some governments but are not always followed.  Leaders and those aspiring to power will manipulate religion, culture, and policies to their own benefit.  This is manifest on the ground as some conflicts that are framed as religious, as in Christians versus Muslims in Sudan, are actually conflicts over scarce resources (Polgreen, 2007).  Fault line conflicts exist because of competition for resources, prestige, power, or pride but are exacerbated by leaders who want to push an agenda.
Third, as sovereign nations, states will act in their own best interest and are not beholden to any higher ideal or leader.  States will act in conjunction with other like-minded states if it is a benefit to them.  In Huntington’s Gulf War example not all Islamic countries declared war on the West, and those that took sides in the conflict did so because they derived or hoped to gain some benefit.  The leaders that spun the conflict as the “West against Islam” did so because they benefitted from it (Huntington, p. 35). 
Fourth, Huntington argued, “common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur” (ibid, p. 38), however Iraq invaded Kuwait instead of negotiating.  Hutus attempted to exterminate Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, and other intra-civilization conflicts have taken place and continue to occur.
Fifth, exposure to other civilizations lessens fear of other civilizations.  As people try to develop the best way of life for themselves they will adopt aspects of other civilizations.  As the West is not devoid of Muslims, many who have relocated from what Huntington calls the Islamic civilization have found a compatible way of life in the West.  Many Muslims studied the West and tried to incorporate aspects of the West in their government, calling for change to government in the Arab Spring of 2011.  Many nations hastened to adapt their governments to the demands of the people, which included Western ideas such as democracy, human rights, and other freedoms (Recknagel, 2013).
Sixth, the African civilization will be a major player in international relations due to its resources, land mass, and growing population.  Africa is no longer the colonial playground of the West and as it develops is able to take care of its own needs and take a greater leadership role in the world.  High-tech manufacturing requires the rare earth minerals found in Africa, and Africa holds a great deal of oil wealth- which is increasing in value as Middle-East stocks decline.

References

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 22-49. 
Polgreen, Lydia. 2007. A Godsend for Darfur, or a Curse? The New York Times, 22 July 2007. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/weekinreview/22polgreen.html?pagewanted=all
Recknagel, Charles. 2013. What Happened to the Arab Spring? The Atlantic, 3 Jan 2013. Available: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/what-happened-to-the-arab-spring/266778/

Thursday, January 3, 2013

Africa: TV Character Burial Ground

While I was watching Season 4 of Psych last night on Netflix I was surprised by the main character's girlfriend suddenly deciding to break off the relationship and go to Uganda to teach for six months or longer.  Despite desperate pleas from the girlfriend the main character would not leave Santa Barbara and go with her to Africa. It seems like a common way to get rid or write characters out of a script- send them to Africa on a do-good mission that they can't refuse.

However, the USA series Covert Affairs first seemingly got rid of Auggies girlfriend by sending her on a Peace Corps mission in Eritrea, but managed to weave her back into the story.  It would be cool if they were to integrate actual Peace Corps work in the show for some reality.  However, the Peace Corps mission in Eritrea is currently closed and was only open 1995-1998.

Thursday, December 13, 2012

Let Mali fight its own battles

Earlier this year when Captain Sanogo took over the government of Mali in an accidental coup he said his intention was to get the resources he needed to defeat Touraeg and Islamist forces in the north.  In the chaos that followed Malian military forces were driven from the north and the independent state of Azawad was established.  No other state recognizes Azawad and the rebel organization that led the fight to establish Azawad, the Mouvement national pour la libĂ©ration de l'Azawad (MNLA), seems to have lost power to Islamic extremists such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  AQIM has sought to install its particular brand of Islam in Azawad, imposed Sharia Law, and destroyed ancient temples and shrines that it found offensive.

Despite gaining great power in Mali, Sanogo has not accomplished his original objective of reinforcing and rearming the Malian military to defeat enemy forces in the north.  I assume that running a country was a bigger challenge than he wanted so he took a step back to allow the interim President and Prime Ministers to deal with the political mess.  It is evident that Sanogo retains great influence as the former Prime Minister was arrested this week by military troops and was replaced with a new Prime Minister.  The former Prime Minister had disagreed with Sanogo by advocating for the international community to put foreign troops on the ground to take back Azawad.  Sanogo, however has maintained that he wants his own troops to do the fighting and wants international support.

I think that it is noble for Mali to want to take care of its own problems.  If part of the United States was taken over by rebels we would want to take care of the problem ourselves, without foreign troops doing the fighting for us.  Letting France do the fighting would be like running back to a former colonial master, and would likely oblige Mali to engage in unfavorable trade with France in the future.  Other countries that have pledged troops under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) don't have a great reputation for being neutral in ECOWAS peace keeping operations.  It would be easier for Mali to deal with peer countries in ECOWAS than major western powers like the US or France, however the quality of forces from ECOWAS countries are less capable. 

The US has already committed troops in Africa to the hunt for the LRA but mainly in a support and advisory role.  The US involvement in Libya was controversial at home, especially following the murder of Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi.  With ongoing economic problems in the US, the looming fiscal cliff, and defense cuts the US might not be as willing to engage with boots on the ground in Mali for a campaign that will most likely last several months, if not longer.  However, the US can contribute airlift support, intelligence, equipment, fuel, food, training, and funding.  Other allies can do the same.

As Malians should coordinate their own efforts to retake the north, they should host a conference with countries willing to contribute and coordinate their potential resources in a clear, open manner.  If the Malians are suspected of stealing donor support donations would be limited.  Advisers from France, US, and other allies can help the Malian leadership with developing a campaign plan but the operations should be Mali led and fought by Mali troops.

Before the loss of northern Mali, the military was estimated to have 8000 active troops (7,350 Army, 400 Air Force, and 50 Navy).  There were an additional 1,800 Gendarmerie, 2000 Republican Guard, and 3000 militia.  The military of Mali was trained to the point of contributing troops to international peace keeping operations in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Central African Republic.  However, much equipment was lost in the north when government troops fled and there was a falling out between the Republican Guard loyal to the former president and the military so the amount of troops and equipment available for military campaign is reduced.  The government can also conscript and train additional adults to serve in the military to augment Malian combat strength (and will take more time).

The MNLA forces that drove government forces from the north were well equipped with heavy weapons from the Libya war.  AQIM troops are also well financed from kidnapping ransoms, donations, drug trafficking, theft, and network support.  Foreign fighters have also joined MNLA/AQIM troops in northern Mali and terrorist groups have set up training camps in the region.

The fight to take back northern Mali will not be easy or quick, but can be accomplished successfully if Malian troops are well armed, equipped, and motivated.  This can be done without foreign combat boots on the ground but would still require great international support and donations with little corruption.  It seems that international donors, ECOWAS, and other major powers are willing to contribute to the cause to liberate the north of Mali so funding is available.  However, the questions that still linger are who is really in charge of the government?  Can donors support a government that gained power through a coup? and What is the political future of Mali?

Wednesday, December 12, 2012

Thesis Defense

Yesterday I successfully defended my thesis "COIN and the LRA" before a panel of professors at Boston University.  After a 15 minute overview of my paper the panel quizzed me for 45 minutes, and in the end, I passed without any need for revision or correction.  The questions the panel asked were interesting and mostly not related to my study of the Ugandan counterinsurgency strategy targeting the Lord's Resistance Army. 

One professor claimed that the LRA did not meet the model of a traditional insurgency in the past ten years as they have relied more on child abductions for recruitment. I countered that there are many insurgent groups in Africa and other places that recruit child soldiers so the LRA is not a singular example.  Also, the use of abducted children changes the way the community interacts with the insurgents as their own children are forced to participate against their will.  Community support of the insurgents is always critical to the success of an insurgency.  I also cited the 2000 Amnesty Act and traditional reconciliation methods such as Mato Oput that eased the return of former combatants.

Another professor focused on criticizing US military COIN doctrine that I referenced in my paper.  The US military published new counterinsurgency doctrine in Field Manual 3-24 in 2006.  The new doctrine was put together by General Petraeus and a panel of experts and based on the thinking of David Galula.  Galula published his book in 1964 "Counterinsurgecy Warfare: Theory and Practice" based on his own counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria as a platoon commander.  However, the professor on my panel questioned the legitimacy of the doctrine as he claimed that Galula embellished his successes.  The other examples upon which the new US doctrine was based were mostly from failed efforts so they were unlikely to result in success.  This is something that Martin van Creveld also argued in his 2008 piece "The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq."  The panelist also argued that the new US COIN doctrine did not result in success in either Iraq or Afghanistan and the only reason why Iraq quieted down was the US paying off Iraqi leaders (what I call the "Cash as COIN" policy).  Paying off insurgents isn't in US COIN doctrine, but it appears its a tactic that the US frequently uses.

I countered that even though US COIN doctrine in FM 3-24 may be based upon failed counterinsurgency efforts there are many good points that the government of Uganda used to defeat the LRA.  I believe that appropriating the causes of the insurgency through northern development programs, cutting off Sudanese support for the LRA, and military operations to drive the LRA far from Ugandan territory were critical in defeating the LRA.  The military manual lists many different tactics that can be helpful in defeating an insurgency but before a comprehensive COIN strategy is developed the government must first study the insurgency and try to understand it to develop a customized COIN plan.  Unity of effort is critical as well as demonstrated in the Ugandan LRA example where President Museveni shorted the Bigombe talks in 1994 by demanding an immediate surrender from Kony.  Instead, Kony and the LRA fled to southern Sudan where they established bases, were financed and supplied by the Sudanese government, and increased raids on Uganda. 

Another example of successful COIN a professor on my panel cited was the extermination of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka by military operations.  The professor claimed that if the government doesnt care about international outcry and killing lots of people its not necessary to follow my more gentle COIN recommendations.  My counter-argument was that even though the insurgents may have been wiped out, the underlying problems still remained and protests and insurgency would probably return when conditions allowed or it was worth the risk.

Monday, November 19, 2012

Questions on military intervention in Mali

As the world gets spun up to send troops into Mali to defeat Islamists and others who established the state of Azawad in northern Mali I have a few concerns.

1.  Mali has been particular with what kind of military assistance it receives and in what manner, preferring to be re-equipped and financed to take care of the northern insurrection itself.  This seems to be inline with CPT Sanogo's original complaint that led to his accidental coup back in March (that the government of Mali wasn't providing enough support to fight northern rebels).

2.  The government situation in Mali still hasn't been sorted out with Sanogo retaining some control of the government.  Currently the US can not provide military assistance or funding to the government of Mali as Sanogo retains some power.  If the Malian army was resupplied, rearmed, and reequipped with Sanogo retaining some control of the military and government it would cement his power.

3.  Nigerian troops have been mentioned as providing a large part of the 3,300 ECOWAS troops intervening in Mali given their participation in past African Union, UN, and ECOWAS/ECOMOG actions.  However, Nigerian troops earned a bad reputation in Sierra Leone and Liberia for stealing and taking sides in the conflict.  Nigeria has also been fighting its own insurgency without great success against Boko Haram and its not likely they would have success against other Islamist insurgents either.

4.  There is no guarantee this will be a quick and easy fight, regardless of who is fighting.  Mali has been fighting insurgents for some time and when they took over Azawad they did it with heavy weapons and arms from Libya.  Even if the MNLA/Azawadian troops are defeated there will remain some support for the insurgency due to the need for development, ethnic conflict, and other past issues in northern Mali.  The need for development and investment in northern Mali is even greater after extremists have destroyed buildings, sites, and infrastructure deemed incompatible with their beliefs.

5.  By the way, when do coup leaders become recognized as legit leaders and start receiving US aid again? Just when we realize there is no going back and we can gain more from working with them than against them?

Sunday, November 18, 2012

COIN & the LRA

Here's the abstract to my paper on Counter Insurgency and the Lord's Resistance Army:


Abstract
      Insurgency, or the attempts to overthrow the government by military and political means has long been a threat to established governments, especially since the 20th century where the technological advances in the military gave the government superiority that was difficult for the average armed civilian to match.  As insurgent groups engaged in terrorism and guerrilla warfare to overthrow the state, governments have engaged counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics to defeat insurgencies.  The ongoing 26-year insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda is illustrative of COIN tactics, its successes, and failures.  Examination of Ugandan COIN will reveal which tactics were most effective and how others could have been implemented better.  The study of Ugandan LRA COIN tactics may also yield suggestions for how to deal with other insurgencies in the region.

     I am still revising my paper and I may re-edit my abstract again but I am running out of time!  My paper goes to the presses this coming Saturday so I can turn it in early Monday, 26 Nov 2012.  After that I have a week to prepare for my paper defense to be scheduled some time during the first two weeks of December.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Working on Thesis

I'm still here, just focused on my thesis "Counterinsurgency and the Lord's Resistance Army." Its due by Thanksgiving so I got a lot of work to do!