Questions on military intervention in Mali

As the world gets spun up to send troops into Mali to defeat Islamists and others who established the state of Azawad in northern Mali I have a few concerns.

1.  Mali has been particular with what kind of military assistance it receives and in what manner, preferring to be re-equipped and financed to take care of the northern insurrection itself.  This seems to be inline with CPT Sanogo's original complaint that led to his accidental coup back in March (that the government of Mali wasn't providing enough support to fight northern rebels).

2.  The government situation in Mali still hasn't been sorted out with Sanogo retaining some control of the government.  Currently the US can not provide military assistance or funding to the government of Mali as Sanogo retains some power.  If the Malian army was resupplied, rearmed, and reequipped with Sanogo retaining some control of the military and government it would cement his power.

3.  Nigerian troops have been mentioned as providing a large part of the 3,300 ECOWAS troops intervening in Mali given their participation in past African Union, UN, and ECOWAS/ECOMOG actions.  However, Nigerian troops earned a bad reputation in Sierra Leone and Liberia for stealing and taking sides in the conflict.  Nigeria has also been fighting its own insurgency without great success against Boko Haram and its not likely they would have success against other Islamist insurgents either.

4.  There is no guarantee this will be a quick and easy fight, regardless of who is fighting.  Mali has been fighting insurgents for some time and when they took over Azawad they did it with heavy weapons and arms from Libya.  Even if the MNLA/Azawadian troops are defeated there will remain some support for the insurgency due to the need for development, ethnic conflict, and other past issues in northern Mali.  The need for development and investment in northern Mali is even greater after extremists have destroyed buildings, sites, and infrastructure deemed incompatible with their beliefs.

5.  By the way, when do coup leaders become recognized as legit leaders and start receiving US aid again? Just when we realize there is no going back and we can gain more from working with them than against them?

COIN & the LRA

Here's the abstract to my paper on Counter Insurgency and the Lord's Resistance Army:

Abstract

      Insurgency, or the attempts to overthrow the government by military and political means has long been a threat to established governments, especially since the 20^th century where the technological advances in the military gave the government superiority that was difficult for the average armed civilian to match.  As insurgent groups engaged in terrorism and guerrilla warfare to overthrow the state, governments have engaged counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics to defeat insurgencies.  The ongoing 26-year insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda is illustrative of COIN tactics, its successes, and failures.  Examination of Ugandan COIN will reveal which tactics were most effective and how others could have been implemented better.  The study of Ugandan LRA COIN tactics may also yield suggestions for how to deal with other insurgencies in the region.

     I am still revising my paper and I may re-edit my abstract again but I am running out of time!  My paper goes to the presses this coming Saturday so I can turn it in early Monday, 26 Nov 2012.  After that I have a week to prepare for my paper defense to be scheduled some time during the first two weeks of December.

Working on Thesis

I'm still here, just focused on my thesis "Counterinsurgency and the Lord's Resistance Army." Its due by Thanksgiving so I got a lot of work to do!

Book Review: Sudan

 Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence by Jok Madut Jok

Written in 2007 before the referendum on South Sudan and the independence of South Sudan in 2011, Jok’s book on Sudan provides good insight into the issues that caused the division of Sudan.  The book focuses on the time period after independence in 1956 where an Arab government has tried to convert the diverse population of Sudan to the Arab culture and Islamic religion.  The government gave preference to Arab Muslims over Black or African Muslims even though it is hard to distinguish and culture and ethnicity were fluid in the past.  As competition for scarce resources became more intense the government sided with Arab Muslims over all others and led to what the US has characterized as genocide in the Darfur region. However, the US and other world powers decided to take no action with Darfur in case it would disrupt the long-negotiated peace deal between the north and south.   

Jok was very thorough in his book and his details on military abuses, gender violence, resettlement, using aid to cause people to convert, starvation tactics, and the fight over oil revenues showed that the violence would continue after independence for South Sudan.  It seems that the war between Sudan and South Sudan has continued unabated as the north has bombed southern areas repeatedly and their respective militaries have engaged in combat on several occasions.  Sudan has also continued to repopulate Darfur and refugees continue to flee to Chad, CAR, and Sudan’s other neighbors.  Jok also foresaw the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments and arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir, issued in March 2009 for war crimes and in July 2010 for genocide and discussed the ICC investigations in 2006.

Sudan and South Sudan are still negotiating oil profits as most of the oil is produced in the south but must pass through the pipelines in the north to the refineries and Port of Sudan.  Other pipelines are under construction in the south to Kenya and through Ethiopia to Djibouti to provide alternate routes for the oil, but are not expected to be completed until 2015 or later.

Now that the southern issue has been resolved with the independence of South Sudan, what will happen with Darfur?

UPDF Thesis Musings

At the beginning of summer I thought I had a great thesis idea, to explore the evolution of the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) from a bush army that brought Museveni to power to a professional fighting force leading the fight against Al Shabab in Somalia.  In May I traveled to Uganda for 30 days to research the UPDF and met with some Ugandan officers, soldiers, regular people, Ugandan military trainers, and politicians who fought with Museveni in the independence war.  However, it was hard to get information about the transformation of the UPDF.  People were very proud of the way they came to power defeating the government forces, and what they are doing now in Somalia and the region hunting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), but didnt share much about the interim period.  While I was there an American researcher was arrested by the Ugandan secret police for asking too many questions of military officers so I ran out of sources.  After that, nobody wanted to discuss the UPDF and I didn't want to end up in a secret prison, so I dropped it.

I also discovered that although the UPDF is doing great things in Somalia and is a pretty good fighting force, some issues remain.  For example, there is no established program for promotion in the military and no retirement program.  You have to know someone to get promoted or a pay raise, which pays off if you are the President's son and just got promoted to General and placed in command of the Ugandan Special Forces.  However, there are many privates who have served since the bush wars and never got promoted or advanced.  One officer I interviewed said there was no retirement program so people serve indefinitely because there is no life after the military.  That's also why many of the military leaders develop side businesses (like rental vehicle agencies, shipping companies, hotels).  The officer also explained that the Ugandan budget did not provide for pay or planning beyond the month or year so there was no assurances that there would be pay for retirees in the future.  He did say that he got special government housing as a perk.  Another concern I had about the UPDF is that some leaders had risen to power after being implicated in the violent suppression of the opposition. 

As it comes time to officially commit to a thesis I am starting to doubt my thesis.  Is there enough substance to this topic?

Other ideas I had were to explore the security situation in Chad, looking at the 2008 rebel advance, French support, tribal pressures, Libyan interference, and religious conflict.  The other idea was look into the bromance between Museveni, Kagame, and Kabila from their origins in the bush to current discord with Uganda forces banned from the DRC and Rwanda forces messing around in the DRC.

There isn't a whole lot written about Chad so it will be hard to find a multitude of sources.  However, there is a whole lot written about the MKK love triangle and their involvement of the wars of central Africa.  I have always thought it was interesting how Kagame worked for Museveni when Museveni was fighting to come to power.  Then Museveni and Kagame brought Kabila to power but were given the boot after the second Congo war.  Their relationships still affect conflict in the region.

Any suggestions?

Gambian Executions

President Jammeh of the Gambia made headlines on 19 August 2012 at a celebration of Eid (Muslim holiday celebrating the end of Ramadan) by announcing his plans to execute all 47 prisoners on death row by September.  President Jammeh said "There is no way my government will allow 99 per cent of the population to be held to ransom by criminals."  Some of the death row prisoners were political prisoners sentenced to death for treason, including former military and intelligence chiefs.  Amnesty International reported the first executions on 24 August 2012, saying nine prisoners were executed the previous night.  On 27 August 2012 the Interior Minister confirmed that nine prisoners were executed by firing squad and that the rest of the executions would taken place by mid-September.

Coming from a country (the United States) where prisoners are still executed for their crimes I am familiar with the debate surrounding capital punishment, and the US can't really criticize the Gambia for executing their prisoners since we do it too.  We also have criticism regarding the fairness of trials and executing innocent prisoners, but I question the timing of the executions.  It seems that the government of the Gambia is drawing out the period of executions over a couple weeks.  Is the plan to execute nine or ten prisoners per week?  Wouldn't it be more merciful and efficient to execute all the prisoners at once?  What advantages does the Gambia gain by lengthening the execution period as with every execution or the discussion of the execution generates more international outrage?  Perhaps the intent is to keep the Gambia and President Jammeh in the spotlight?  Perhaps I am missing something else entirely- if so, please let me know.

I thought President Jammeh's speech was interesting that he kept addressing Muslims in general and the true believers, asking them to come together to save their noble religion and the Quaran.  He also referred to conflicts in the middle-east and in Afghanistan and the need to rid themselves of false believers/pretenders within. 

Details on the 9 executed can be found at http://observer.gm/africa/gambia/article/9-death-row-inmates-executed 

Leadership Transition in Africa

When the Arab spring blew through northern Africa in early 2011 many had high hopes of popular uprisings that would lead to regime change and better quality of life for the rest of the continent.  However, sustained popular uprisings didn’t blossom into a season of change for a number of reasons: violent crackdowns, lack of a middle class that could support the change, lack of hope, etc… But maybe Mother Nature had a back-up plan for change in sub-Saharan Africa.

Over the past two years a number of long-lasting African heads of state have expired, leading to change.  Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua led the charge, dying on 5 May 2010 causing an unexpected change in leadership with then Vice-President Jonathon Goodluck completing the term and upsetting a rotation of political leadership between the North and South of Nigeria, which also has contributed in part to the ongoing violence in Nigeria. 

Guinea-Bissau has experienced lately a mess of leadership since the death of Malam Bacai Sanhà on 9 January 2012.  Raimundo Pereira was the acting president until he was deposed in a coup d’état on 12 April 2012.

In Malawi, President Bingu wa Mutharika died of a heart attack on 5 April 2012 and then Vice-President Joyce Banda was only able to secure the presidency two days later on 7 April 2012 after the military stepped in to support her and the succession of the presidency as directed in the constitution.  Mutharika’s brother had tried to secure the presidency for himself and had recruited the Chief of Police in his support but ultimately failed in his bid for power.

Ghana’s President John Atta Mills died on 24 July 2012 and was replaced by Vice-President and now current President John Dramani Mahama.  Unlike in Malawi there was no drama in the passing of power to the Vice-President. 

Ethiopia’s Head of State, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres' was the latest to expire on 20 August 2012 after a long undisclosed illness.  Prime Minister Zenawi had not been seen for many weeks as he was in treatment in an undisclosed location, but following notice of his death his body was shipped back to Ethiopia from Belgium.  Zenawi was the President of Ethiopia from 1991 to 1995 and then became Prime Minister in 1995 until his recent death.  Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who is also Ethiopia’s foreign minister, is now the acting head of state for Ethiopia.

Other African leaders that expired in office include Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia and Lansana Conté of Guinea in 2008.  Mwanawasa was replaced by his Vice-President Rupiah Banda without any disruption of government but the political situation in Guinea destabilized.  Conté’s successor, Aboubacar Somparé was deposed in a coup the day after taking power. Eventually current President Alpha Condé was elected and assumed the presidency on 21 December 2010.

In every case besides Guinea and Ethiopia, where Conté ruled for 24 years (1984-2008) and Zenawi ruled for 21 years (1991-2012), the fallen African presidents had been democratically elected and had ruled for less than 10 years.  Some were even in their initial terms of office so their governments had and were experiencing changes of leadership and power. 

However, some African heads of state have managed to hang on to power for decades, despite their old age.  President Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe since 1980, although he was the Prime Minister from 1980-1987.  President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda came to power in 1986, President Paul Biya of Cameroon in 1982, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola in 1979, and President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea also in 1979.  President Nguema has the distinction of being the longest serving leader in Africa, coming to power on 3 August 1979, a month before President dos Santos in Angola.  President Denis Sassou Nguesso has also ruled the Republic of Congo since 1979, taking only a five-year break after losing elections in 1992, but returning to power after civil war in 1997.

The mostly peaceful transition of power in Senegal in 2012 following contentious Presidential elections where President Wade altered the constitution to allow him to run for a formerly forbidden third term could have been a disaster.  Violent protests across the country indicated that if President Wade had won a third term chaos would have ensued.  Thankfully, current President Macky Sall defeated Wade in the second round of voting to secure the Presidency.  Former President Wade then gracefully assisted in the transition of power without further incident.

In Cote d’Ivoire the people were not as fortunate as former President Laurent Gbagbo (2000-2011) refused to give up power to the victor of the 2010 elections, current President Alassane Ouattara.  Both claimed the Presidency from December 2010 until April 2011 when forces loyal to Ouattara and backed by France and the United Nations defeated Gbagbo.  In November 2011 Gbagbo was extradited to the Hague (International Criminal Court) where he awaits trial for crimes committed during the post-election violence.